April 10, 2012

Jester dynamic-lesson-asymmetric-unmanaged-cyber-warfare

Jester dynamic-lesson-asymmetric-unmanaged-cyber-warfare 33889 — Document Transcript

  • 1. Interested in learning more about security?SANS InstituteInfoSec Reading RoomThis paper is from the SANS Institute Reading Room site. Reposting is not permitted without express written permission. The Jester Dynamic: A Lesson in Asymmetric Unmanaged Cyber Warfare Sophisticated and complex to implement, long-term cyber attacks are often considered the work of intelligent agencies and crime syndicates. However, the oversight and bureaucracy that comes from such management often hinders the ultimate lethality of the attack. In this paper, we will examine the significant impact a lone-wolf patriot hacker has had over the course of the last two years, and what important lessons we can learn from him on how to wage a successful fight in this domain. We will highlight the relatively s... Copyright SANS Institute Author Retains Full Rights AD
  • 2. The Jester Dynamic: A Lesson in Asymmetric Unmanaged Cyber Warfare GIAC (GCPM) Gold Certification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
  • 3. The Jester Dynamic! 2(1. Introduction We live in an era where a single soldier can digitally leak thousands of classifieddocuments (possibly changing the course of war), attackers can compromise unmanneddrone control software and intercept unencrypted video feeds, and recreational hackerscan steal and release personal information from members of cyber think-tanks.(McCullagh, 2009) (Finkle, 2011) Our inability to defend ourselves against the onslaughtof such attacks constantly reminds us of the bureaucracy that comes with largeorganizations tasked with defending and launching such attacks. As a nation, we still donot understand cyber. An asymmetric platform, cyber favors the individual. This couldnot be more evident than when analyzing the capabilities of a single lone-wolf patriothacker. In this paper, we will discuss the actions of a cyber minuteman known as TheJester (aka th3j35t3r) and assess his ability to successfully conduct asymmetricunmanaged cyber warfare.2. Background On December 30, 2010, a patriot hacker posted a message to an Internet ChatRelay (IRC) Server. Quoting Steve Jobs, the hacker typed: “A small team of A playerscan run circles round a giant team of B and C players” (Th3j35t3r, 2010). Known asTh3j35ter, the hacker claimed to have just successfully compromised members of apowerful hacker group known as Anonymous. By back-dooring the Anonymous group’sLow Orbit Ion Canon toolkit, the hacker had removed the anonymous functionality froma toolkit of the members of the rival hacker group and planned to expose them. Most inthe intelligence and cyber-security communities would consider this feat alone a cyber-war grand slam. However, this attack happened halfway into a two-year campaign ofover two hundred successful attacks, with targets ranging from militant jihadists,ministers of hate, WikiLeaks to rival hacker groups. Before we discuss the tools,campaign, and effectiveness of this hacker, let us begin with some general backgroundinformation about the patriot lone-wolf hacker known as The Jester.)*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 4. The Jester Dynamic! 3(2.1. Military Service Background As The Jester’s cyber-attack campaign began with militant jihadists, it does notseem a far stretch that he would have a US military background. In an interview with thewebsite threatchaos.com, The Jester claimed to have served as a former soldier in supportof Special Forces deployed to Afghanistan. “I am an ex-soldier with a rather famousunit…. I was involved with supporting Special Forces, I have served in (and around)Afghanistan amongst other places” (Greene, 2010). Often confused with Special Operations Forces, the US Special Forces Commandcontains five active component and two National Guard component groups with specificregional orientations. Members of each group are subject matter experts in their specificregional area of operation and conduct seven doctrinal missions: UnconventionalWarfare, Foreign Internal Defense, Special Reconnaissance, Direct Action, CombattingTerrorism, Counter-proliferation, and Information Operations (Special, 2012). Since9/11, thousands of soldiers have deployed with Special Forces Groups to Afghanistan. InAfghanistan, Special Forces Operation Detachments proved instrumental in establishingthe Northern Alliance that ousted the Taliban Government. It is highly likely that in thecourse of conducting or supporting Special Forces missions, The Jester could have gainedthe technical skillsets necessary to perform his current cyber attacks. However, at least one defense official offers a contradicting viewpoint. Anunnamed former defense operative argued in a New York Times interview that The Jesterwas a “former military contractor involved in US Special Operations Command projects”(Vance, 2010). Three command levels above the Special Forces, USSOCOM mission isto support the geographic combatant commanders, ambassadors and their country teams,and other government agencies by preparing Special Operations Forces to successfullyconduct special operations, including civil affairs and psychological operations. With anannual budget of $4.9 billion, USSOCOM employs several subject matter expertcontractors, including those with specific technical skillsets (Global Security, 2012). It isequally likely that The Jester served in the capacity of a contractor to support aUSSOCOM mission. Finally, it is also possible that The Jester transitioned to a role as aUSSOCOM contractor after leaving his support role in the US Special Forces.)*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 5. The Jester Dynamic! 4( Additionally, The Jester also claimed to have served twice as an “airbornefrontline combat trooper” (h3r0d07u5, 2011). Considered the home of the Airborne, andalso host to US Army Special Operations Command and formerly two Special ForcesGroups, Fort Bragg may be a former post if The Jester did serve in the military.Regardless of the exact specifics, it does appear that his prior service fundamentallymotivates The Jester to carry out cyber attacks. In the next section, we will examine someof these specific motivations.2.2. The Motivations and Philosophy of Utilitarianism Largely motivated by his prior military service, The Jester appears focused ondenying safe haven to terrorists and ministers of hate that use the Internet as theirplatform. In an early 2010 interview, The Jester discussed “the horror of watching hisfriends and fellow soldiers be murdered by Jihadi operatives who have long beenexploiting the Internet” (Freed, 2010). During the Hacker Halted security conference, TheJester spoke with conference attendees via Internet Relay Chat. Figure 1 shows a partialtranscript from this discussion. He argued that the omnipotence and growth of theInternet has granted terrorists a safe haven, and stated his intentions to prevent suchaction. Furthermore, The Jester claims to have discovered caches of Jihadi informationplanted on legitimate US sites by Jihadi hackers (Freed, 2010).18:28] <@th3j35t3r> I am motivated by the fact that previously...[18:28] <@th3j35t3r> for a bad person to recruit a potential bad person.... [18:28] <@th3j35t3r> teach them to make IEDs...[18:29] <@th3j35t3r> or vests[18:29] <@th3j35t3r> they had to meet[18:29] <@th3j35t3r> which was great[18:29] <@th3j35t3r> made them easier to spot[18:29] <@th3j35t3r> now[18:29] <@th3j35t3r> there is no need for a physical meeting [18:30] <@th3j35t3r> I am here to say - no guys - you aint gonna use the web to blowmy buds up. Figure 1: Partial Th3J35t3r Transcript From Hacker Halted This internal desire to deny Internet sanctuary to Jihadists appears to stem fromhis military service. His service also appears to push his desire to protect both current andfallen American soldiers. After attacking the Westboro Baptist Church for protesting atthe funerals of fallen US soldiers, The Jester posted: “There is an unequal amount of)*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 6. The Jester Dynamic! 5(good and bad in most things. The trick is to work out the ratio and act accordingly”(Th3J35t3r, 2010). This quote closely resembles the fundamentals behind the ethicaltheory of utilitarianism, best described by Jeremy Bentham as the greatest happinessprinciple. Bentham asserts that an individual can only weigh the ethical considerations ofan action by knowing and calculating the consequences and outcomes (Bentham, 1948).This philosophy accurately describes The Jester’s actions. In a 2010 interview, The Jesterexplained his ethical concerns about his attacks: “I do wrestle with whether what I amdoing is right, but figure if I can make their communications unreliable for them, all thebetter” (Freed, 2010). Over a two-year period, The Jester has successfully attacked over two hundredtargets. One could argue that The Jester almost feels compelled to prevent his adversariesfrom succeeding in their message of hate. Considering the sheer enormity of targets TheJester has successfully attacked over a prolonged period of time, this endeavor has mostlikely become a lifestyle and mission for The Jester. In section four, we will closely studyspecific targets. However, let us outline a broad overview of the timeline of activities inthe next section.2.3. Timeline of Activities( ( Figure 2: Timeline of The Jester’s Significant Activities We can best split The Jester’s attacks into six separate campaigns that we willexpand in section 4. The Jester launched the first campaign on January 1, 2010. On thisday, he began a series of attacks against militant Jihadists websites with an attack onwww.alemarah.info. During his militant Jihadists attacks, The Jester primarily used hishomebrew tool, XerXes, to deny service to these particular websites. This attack)*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 7. The Jester Dynamic! 6(continues to date, with the latest attack occurring on December 4, 2011, againsthttp://www.majahden.com/, with a new tool aptly named Saladin. Nearly a year into his disruption of militant Jihadists websites, The Jester attackedthe WikiLeaks Web site on November 28, 2010. While still a denial of service attack, thisattack differed from previous attacks. Previous attacks lasted for only short periods oftime. In the attack on WikiLeaks, The Jester tweeted “TANGO DOWN - INDEFINITLEY- for threatening the lives of our troops and ‘other assets’.” This attack also lead TheJester into his next campaign to attack those who supported WikiLeak’s defense,primarily the hacker group Anonymous. The campaign against Anonymous began on January 24, 2011. During this phase,The Jester showed an entirely new skillset by performing reconnaissance against themembers of the hacker group and then exposing them through a back-doored executableprovided to the members of the group. Although The Jester and Anonymous appeared towork together during his next campaign, The Jester did appear to gloat when fifteenmembers of Anonymous were arrested in June 2011: “15 more ‘Anonymous’ arrested(again). Legion didnt ‘expect’ that huh - Tick Tock Toldya.” Regardless of their differences, it appears The Jester and Anonymous workedtogether to attack The Westboro Baptist Church. The longest-running individual attack,The Jester shut down the website run by the controversial Westboro Baptist Church fromlate February 2011 to March 2011. Almost a week into the attack, The Jester bragged thathis attack platform was a single 3G phone that shut down the website of The WestboroBaptist Church. After attacking The Westboro Baptist Church, The Jester moved onto a moreinternational target, where he changed tactics again. With rebel uprisings and internalturmoil happening in Libya, The Jester hatched a plan to disrupt online media with falsenews stories. This psychological operations campaign culminated with the successfulinjection of stories into popular news media like the Tripoli Post in March 2011. As The Jester successfully attacked Libyan online media, a new and dangeroussplinter cell of Anonymous formed. This elite crew, known as LulzSec, attackedsignificant targets, including the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States. By)*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 8. The Jester Dynamic! 7(June of 2011, it appeared as if nobody could stop “The Lulz.” Teaming with anindependent group of security professionals, The Jester uncovered the true identity of thegroup’s leader in the summer of 2011. A successful arrest of the group’s key membersended The Jester’s campaign against LulzSec by fall 2011.((2.4. False Identities, Sympathizers and Supporters Arguably, The Jester has many sympathizers, with over 28,000 Twitter followers.Let us assume that some of these provide limited intelligence support to The Jester inidentifying malicious activities and nominating potential targets. However, based on hisability to remain anonymous, it is generally assumed that The Jester does not receive anymaterial support from his sympathizers. A note on his official blog further indicates thatThe Jester would prefer his sympathizers contribute to the Wounded Warrior Project, anorganization that provides support to disabled veterans returning from war. During an operation to identify the personal identity of the hacker known as#anonymousSabu, The Jester confessed that at least fifteen individuals had been falselyidentified as The Jester and “have been doxed… always incorrectly” (Th3J35t3r, 2010).In October 2011, The Jester tweeted that “rjacksix was first of at least 15 folks incorrectlydoxed as me over year ago.” As he was the first individual falsely identified, it provesimportant to dig deeper into Mr. Robin Jackson (aka rjacksix). During the operation known as Operation Payback, the hacker group Anonymoustargeted Mr. Jackson. It is unknown how Anonymous identified Mr. Jackson as TheJester. Mr. Anthony Freed, a reporter at InfoSec Island, scoured social networking mediaWeb sites to discover that Mr. Jackson was the Chief of Management Services Bureau forthe State of Montana (Freed, 2010). Furthermore, Mr. Jackson formally studied theRussian language for the military, learned to program at Fort Meade (home of the USCyber Command), and worked in the SCADA industry for GE (Freed, 2010). Mr.Jackson’s profile certainly appears as if he could be a possible candidate. Another figure closely linked to The Jester is Dr. Sam Bowne. A professor at theCity College San Francisco, Dr. Sam Bowne presented research about The Jester atDEFCON 2011. At DEFCON 2011, Dr. Bowne confessed that he had been incommunication with The Jester throughout The Jester’s initial attack on WikiLeaks. Mr.)*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 9. The Jester Dynamic! 8(Bowne claimed The Jester even paused his attack briefly to provide proof of the attack(Bowne, 2011). Dr. Bowne and The Jester publically argued on Twitter in August of2011, as shown in Figure 3.Sun Aug 14 16:57:48 +0000 2011,@sambowne if u don’t want ur students to imitate mekeep vilifying me. However they’re far more likely to hook up with #anonymous than me.Sun Aug 14 16:51:44 +0000 2011,RT @sambowne: @th3j35t3r: You need to hide, andyou hide well. But I don’t want students imitating you. cc: @marcus_bpSun Aug 14 16:41:29 +0000 2011,@Marcus_BP @sambowne I am incognito, unlike MrBowne, who has utmost respect, as I have a lot more to worry about than likes ofAnon/Lulz. Figure 3: Twitter Traffic Between The Jester and Mr. Sam Bowne In preparation for this article, we spoke with Dr. Browne. He referred us to blog,where he argued that The Jester’s activities are illegal. (Bowne, 2011) Further, he wantedto make it clear that he did not condone The Jester’s activities in any capacity. It ispossible that The Jester is a former student of Mr. Bowne, or at least sat in on one of hislectures. However, The Jester and Mr. Sam Bowne may just share respect for eachother’s competency in understanding Layer 7 denial of service (DoS) attacks. BecauseThe Jester used Layer 7 DoS as his original and primary, we will use the next section todiscuss these attacks.3. Attack Platforms3.1. Understanding Layer 7 DoS Layer 7 DoS attacks prove the majority of The Jester’s over two hundredsuccessful cyber attacks. As opposed to a distributed denial of service attack (DDoS),Layer 7 DoS attacks require only one attacker instead of many. The attacks can be routedover proxies and prove difficult for an administrator to distinguish from normal traffic.(Bowne, 2011) Two different attack toolkits highlight the flaws used in executing a Layer 7 DoSattack. First, we will examine the toolkit slowloris, written by Rsnake (Rsnake, 2012).Rsnake’s slowloris toolkit succeeds in crippling a web server with minimal bandwidthand minimal side effects on unrelated services and ports (Rsnake, 2012). It performs this)*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 10. The Jester Dynamic! 9(attack by splitting HTTP requests and sending only limited parts at a time. This maintainsan open connection on the web server, which keeps sockets from closing. In doing so, thetoolkit exhausts the available sockets from the target. Instead of sending HTTP requests, a separate toolkit known as R-U-Dead-Yet(RUDY) consumes resources by abusing HTTP POSTS (Raviv, 2010). RUDY slowlytrickles one-byte injections into a post field. The target webserver consumes endlessthreads waiting for slowly trickled posts, exhausting the resources of the web server andcrippling it. Although The Jester’s exact attack vector is unknown, many have speculated thathis attacks are similar in nature to Slowloris, RUDY, or both. In the following section, wewill examine his toolkits used in his attacks.3.2. XerXes, Leonidis, and Saladin In two separately released videos, The Jester publicized his toolkit known asXerXes (Freed, 2010). With a rather robust graphical user interface, the toolkitgraphically depicts the attack in progress and allows The Jester to control it in real time.Both videos provide insight into the toolkit. It appears The Jester routes the trafficthrough an anonymous network such as TOR, with icons for both the entry and exit, andintermediate notes that route the attack, as shown in Figure 5. A supposedly leakedsource code (which The Jester has publically denied) shows the use of cycling throughTOR networks to attack, as shown in Figure 4.void cycle_identity() { int r; int socket = make_socket("localhost", "9050"); write(socket, "AUTHENTICATE ""n", 16); while(1) { r=write(socket, "signal NEWNYMnx00", 16); fprintf(stderr, "[%i: cycle_identity -> signal NEWNYMn", r); usleep(300000); }} Figure 4: Partial Leak of XerXes Source Code Furthermore, the toolkit appears to allow The Jester to select attack options, thetype of target server, and automatically post the results to the Twitter social media site.)*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 11. The Jester Dynamic! 10( Figure 5: XerXes Denial of Service Toolkit Early criticism of XerXes argued that the tool was only capable of hittingunhardened Apache webservers vulnerable to the SlowLoris and RUDY types of attacks.However, The Jester has publically stated via Twitter that since March 2010 XerXes hasbeen capable of targeting IIS servers in addition to Apache. In a July 2011 posting shownin Figure 6, The Jester argued also that many of his targets have had a platform other thanApache.Fri Jul 08 21:14:10 +0000 2011,FTR: the purported ‘XerXeS source’ leak is bogus. Itsnot getting released, and isn’t limited to Apache as has been demonstrated many times.Fri Jul 08 20:42:39 +0000 2011,@sambowne - come on Sam? We both know within mytargets over the last 2 years Apache only features as it’s prevalent, theres more than that.Thu Mar 11 22:57:57 +0000 2010,Jester releases 2nd video of enhanced XerXeS attack- http://bit.ly/90IaQd - read it and well...weep cuz it’s not just Apache now. Figure 6: Twitter Exchange about the XerXes Toolkit In addition, The Jester has alluded to developing two separate toolkits namedLeonidis and Saladin. Named after the first Sultan of Egypt and re-capturer of Palestine,Saladin has been used in at least five separate attacks since November 2011. http://anwar-alawlaki.com/ was the first target of Saladin. More powerful than a simple DoS toolkit,)*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 12. The Jester Dynamic! 11(The Jester bragged Tango Down Permanently after attacking anwar-alawlaki.com/.Furthermore, he hinted to the attack vector by stating because #saladin (XerXeS big bro)“knows their p/w and changed it, and deleted you.” Little is known about the Leonidis attack platform, named after the Spartanwarrior-king most famous for his bravery during the Battle of Thermopylae. Other thanreferring to it during his Hacker Halted IRC Chat and a brief mention during an interviewwith Mr. Anthony Freed, The Jester has spoken little publically about the attack platform.While The Jester has his tools, let us use the next section to discuss how he back-dooredthe tools of his adversaries.3.3. Reverse-Engineering Technical Skills The December 2010 attack against Anonymous proved pivotal in defining TheJester’s capabilities as a talented attacker. At this point in his cyber-warfare campaign, heremoved any criticism of his technical skillsets. In his attack against the Hacker groupAnonymous, The Jester falsely advertised a replacement tool for the group’s Low OrbitIon Canon (LOIC) DDoS toolkit and encouraged members of the group to download it,shown in Figure 7.ADVANTAGES OVER LOIC:This tool supports DNS amplify attacks, which can make your DDOS attacks up to 70* aseffective, by combining ip and mac source address spoofing, and trackers over TOR,anonymity is guaranteed Figure 7: ReadMe provided with DHN.zip toolkit However, The Jester added a back-door routine to the toolkit so it would removethe anonymous functionality provided by the tool (Infosec, 2011). Anti-Virus systemsemployed by the hacker group would detect this activity. To hide his malicious activity,The Jester encoded the binary using a UPX packer to evade anti-virus activity. Thus, avirus detection engine could not find a static signature for malicious activity. The binarydecrypted itself to run in memory, successfully evading anti-virus activity. Examining theportable executable section headers from the binary in Figure 8, it is clear it is UPXpacked to evade anti-virus.)*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 13. The Jester Dynamic! 12( Figure 8: UPX Packed DHN.exe Section Table The Jester’s ability to intercept the source code of the DHN.zip toolkit, removefunctionality in the binary without drawing attention, and then repack the binary using aUPX packet to evade anti-virus detection proves worthy of praise. However, the quickrise to popularity and public support has been fueled by The Jester’s savvy social mediacampaign.3.4. Social Media Campaign Arguably one of the most amazing abilities of The Jester is his social mediacampaign. Through his online campaign, The Jester garnered support from otherwiselaw-abiding citizens. Over two years, The Jester posted 918 independent tweets to hissome 28,200+ followers. Additionally, The Jester maintains a fairly robust Wordpressblog, where he has outlined his activities in great technical depth. On his blog, shown inFigure 9, he discusses the motivations and technical aspects of his attacks. Just shy of 1million unique visits (988,622 as of 9 January 2012), The Jester has a considerablefollowing on his Blog. Although The Jester’s personal interviews have been far and few betweencompared to the omnipotence of his attacks, he has spoken on a couple occasions. First,he discussed his motivations and the XerXes toolkit with Mr. Anthony Freed (InfoSecIsland) along with the ethical dilemmas he has faced. Next, Mr. Sam Bowne, ethicalhacking instructor at City College San Francisco, has spoken to him numerous times inregards to specifics of Layer 7 DoS attacks. In addition, the 2600 IRC server has proved asafe haven for The Jester to occasionally entertain questions, as he routinely appears inthe channel #jester.)*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 14. The Jester Dynamic! 13( Figure 9: The Jester’s WordPress Blog On October 26, 2011, The Jester spoke openly with conference attendees fromHacker Halted over an IRC channel (Infosec, 2011). The Jester candidly discussed therationale behind his attacks, his desire to work alone, the specific attacks againstAnonymous and the Libyan online press, and an incident where he mistakenly hit thewrong target. Using his very savvy social media skills, The Jester has garnered publicsupport for his repeated attacks. In the next section, we will discuss the specific attackcampaigns of The Jester.4. Attack Campaigns4.1. Disruption of Militant Jihadist Propaganda On January 1, 2010, The Jester began his campaign to disrupt militant Jihadistweb propaganda. At 11:26, he tweeted “www.alemarah.info is now under sporadic cyberattack. This ‘Voice of Jihad’ served only to act as tool for terrorist. OWNED. By me,Jester.” This began a sustained campaign against over seventy-five other targets over thenext two years. Annex A1 contains a complete list of the sites attacked. In an interview months later, The Jester described his desire to push militantJihadists underground: “If you take the position that online jihadi propaganda,)*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 15. The Jester Dynamic! 14(proselytization, and interaction is increasingly important in jihadi recruitment, then whyis it bad to drive them back into the shadows online? That’s a key principle of COIN[Counter-insurgency].” Almost a year into his campaign against militant Jihadists, The Jester identified atarget that posed a greater threat to US national security. In the following section, we willdiscuss his attacks against the Web site WikiLeaks.4.2. Disruption of WikiLeak’s Dissemination of Classified Data On November 28, 2010, The Jester attacked the WikiLeaks Web site run bynotorious hacker Julian Assange. Although originally launched in 2006, WikiLeaksgained public notoriety in October 2010 when it published over 400,000 classifieddocuments about the Afghan war. US officials coordinated with Amazon, PayPal andMasterCard to prevent future funding of the WikiLeaks supporters. However, the USgovernment did technically very little to successfully knock WikiLeaks offline. In November of 2010, WikiLeaks coordinated to release US State DepartmentCables. At this point, The Jester weighed in with his public objection and disruptedWikiLeaks: “www.wikileaks.org - TANGO DOWN - for attempting to endanger the livesof our troops, ‘other assets’ & foreign relations #wikileaks #fail.” During this attack,Sam Bowne claimed The Jester even paused the attack for a minute to prove he wasbehind it (Bowne, 2011). The attack on WikiLeaks and subsequent fallout lead to an argument between thehacker group Anonymous, which backed WikiLeaks, and The Jester, who had attacked it.This began The Jester’s campaign of personal attacks on members of Anonymous. In thenext section, we will examine some of the key highlights of this campaign.4.3. Tangles with the Anonymous Hacker Group In late January 2011, a public war waged between The Jester and the hackergroup Anonymous. This war waged over Twitter, WordPress blogs, and in private IRCchannels controlled by both Anonymous and The Jester. On January 24th 2011, The Jesterclearly objected to Anonymous’ defense of WikiLeaks when he tweeted: “#WikileaksRest in Peace http://t.co/bw4vfga #anonymous defending a corpse, peace out.”)*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 16. The Jester Dynamic! 15( In response, Anonymous targeted individuals who sympathized with those thatwished to destroy WikiLeaks during Operation Payback. It was during this time that thegroup targeted Robin Jackson, claiming that he was The Jester, a claim The Jester laterdenied". They also attacked the Web sites of MasterCard, PayPal, and Amazon, whichhad removed the ability to send payments to WikiLeaks maintainers. The Jester claimed an official victory in the war when he reverse-engineered andremoved the anonymous functionality out of Anonymous’s DHN.zip toolkit. To advertisehis successful attack, The Jester posted: That’s right ladies and gents, trolls and trollettes, skiddie, wannabe, and poser…. The DHN files that you are downloading, using, and ‘playing’ with are altered versions of the original. These lovely beauties are, in fact, infected by none other than th3j35t3r. (Did Anonymous really think that they could remain anonymous with all their little toys.)4.4. Sustained Attack against Westboro Baptist Church Another key indicator behind The Jester’s motivation lies in his attack against thecontroversial Westboro Baptist Church. The Westboro Baptist Church, lead by Rev FredPhelps, has staged protests at funerals ranging from slain gay college students tomembers of the US military killed in combat. The group typically uses inflammatorylanguage to harass vulnerable victims such as the family members of deceased USmilitary soldiers. Evidence of this is depicted in Figure 10, from the Westboro BaptistChurch’s official Web site, where they provided a flyer to protest the funeral of a fallenUS soldier claiming to “play taps to a fallen fool.” Clearly, this could fuel the anger of anindividual such as The Jester, who claims to have served twice in frontline airbornecombat units. Speaking over an IRC channel during Hacker Halted, The Jester stated hisobjections to the WestBoro Baptist Church: “I draw the line in the sand…when theyattempt to get in the face of the mourners of our military” (InfoSec, 2011). In February 2011, The Jester began an attack that took twenty Web sites of theWestboro Baptist Church down for four straight weeks.)*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 17. The Jester Dynamic! 16( Figure 10: WestBoro Baptist Church’s Flagship Web site, GodHatesFags.com A since-deleted Twitter post by The Jester hinted that the Anonymous hackergroup had also assisted in the attack: “AnonymousIRC The @th3j35t3r and #Anonymouscooperation on #WBC was an eclipse; we’re still like Sun and Moon, following our ownagendas.” Considering that only a month earlier The Jester and Anonymous had gone towar, it definitely demonstrated both groups’ desire to take the Westboro Baptist Churchoffline indefinitely. Officially, the Anonymous group denied any involvement in theattack. Regardless of Anonymous’ activities, it appeared by spring 2011 that The Jesterand Anonymous no longer shared the desire to attack each other. Instead The Jestermoved onto a more substantial target in summer 2011, a target that troubled intelligenceagencies and law enforcement agencies worldwide.4.5. De-Anonymization of LulzSec Known for successfully attacking the Central Intelligence Agency’s web server,the hacker group LulzSec quickly rose to popularity in June 2011. LulzSec additionallyattacked Fox News, PBS, Nintendo, pron.com, the NHS, Infragard, the US Senate,Bethesda, Minecraft, League of Legends, The Escapist magazine, EVE online, TheTimes, and The Sun newspaper (Pwnies, 2011).)*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 18. The Jester Dynamic! 17( During their reign of terror on the Internet, LulzSec came to the attention of TheJester. By mid-June 2011, The Jester indicated his intentions to discover the identities ofthe members of LulzSec when he tweeted: “Gloves off. Expect me. My silence is not anindication of weakness, as your mouth is an indication of yours.” During his attackagainst LulzSec, it is believed that The Jester joined forces with a team of hackers knownas Web Ninjas. These security professionals setup a blog, where they posted the identitiesof supposed LulzSec members at http://lulzsecexposed.blogspot.com. The Jester’smotivation was fueled by his anger of LulzSec’s dumping documents that contained the“names of undercover operators in the field, exposing not only them, but their families”(Th3J35t3r, 2010). Within a week of The Jester declaring “gloves off”, Ryan Cleary was arrested onJune 22, 2011, and charged with five offenses under the Computer Misuse Act(Vinograd, 2011). Cleary was discovered after “someone with apparent links to the groupposted Cleary’s personal details on various websites – including his address, phonenumbers, chat screen names and email address” (Vinograd, 2011). Subsequently, onSeptember 21, the FBI arrested Cody Kretsinger of Phoenix, Arizona, on the suspicionthat he was a member of LulzSec during the attack on Sony Pictures (Eimiller, 2011).Furthermore, individuals within LulzSec were supposedly ousted in anonymous post to apastebin account. These individuals included Sweden-based Daniel Ackerman Sandberg(aka Topiary), Iowa-based Wesley Bailey (aka Laurelai), New York-based EE (orEekdacat), Britain-based Richard Fontaine (aka Uncommon), alleged leader HectorXavier Monsegur (aka Sabu), and Netherlands-based Sven Slootweg (aka Joepie91),among others (IBTimes, 2011). However, this attack was not without controversy. During his work with TeamWeb Ninjas, The Jester identified two separate individuals as #anonymousSabu, theleader of LulzSec. In July, based on information from an intercepted LulzSec IRCsession, The Jester initially fingered Hugo Carvalho as the leader of LulzSec based on adomain name registration and other details. However, after gaining further information,The Jester retracted his accusation and instead pointed the finger at Xavier Monsegur.)*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 19. The Jester Dynamic! 18(4.6. Libyan Disinformation Campaign( In late March 2011, The Jester turned his attacks to the former Libyan strongmanMuammar Gaddafi. During this campaign, The Jester once again changed tactics. Insteadof his using his proven DDoS toolkits XerXes and Saladin, he used a psychologicaloperations trick, possibly learned during his time in the military. In an attempt to break the spirits of troops loyal to Muammar Gaddafi, The Jesterinjected two news stories into The Tripoli Post and a separate news story into the MaltaIndependent Online, shown in Figure 11. The stories were headlined “Gadhafi loyalsoldiers deserting and defecting as key off tows are lost to rebel forces” and “armyabandoning posts across country as rebels advance further and further.” The Jesterpresumably intended for these stories to erode the morale of Gaddafi loyalists and inspirethem to desert their posts. In subsequent Twitter postings, The Jester excitedlyencouraged Libyan defections, including the Libyan Foreign Minister. Figure 11: The Jester’s Compromise of The Tripoli Post Online)*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 20. The Jester Dynamic! 19( In order to inject these stories into two separate newspapers, The Jester used atechnique known as “bit.ly obfuscated intermediary-based code injection” (Freed, 2010).By examining a vulnerability in the PHP code of the two sites, The Jester discovered amethod for injecting images of articles into a search query field of the pages. The Websites then returned these images as direct results, thus appearing to come from thelegitimate news sources instead of The Jester. Considering his technical competence,political agenda, and a proven track record, we will use the next section to discuss theoverall effectiveness of The Jester’s six campaigns of cyber war.5. Assessment of Effectiveness5.1. Demographics and Metrics of Targets In twenty-four months, The Jester has performed over 200 attacks on seventy-fiveunique targets. This means on average that he nominates a new target three weeks andattacks a target just about twice every week. While this pace alone seems astounding,consider another detail: the heavy lifting of The Jester’s work is done between 3:00 PMto midnight EST. Figure 12 shows a distribution of the times The Jester has tweeted“TANGO DOWN.” Before noon EST, The Jester is almost absent from attack. Thissupports the assumption that The Jester may indeed hold at least a part-time job andperform his attacks after returning home. Figure 12: The Distribution of Times Jester Has Successfully Attacked Targets.)*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 21. The Jester Dynamic! 20(Figure 13 also supports this assumption. To create this figure, we totaled the uniqueattacks for each day of the week that The Jester has tweeted “TANGO DOWN.” OnSundays he has attacked over 50 targets, almost double the weekly average. If The Jesterworks Monday through Friday, he may do his research and targeting activities primarilyon Saturday and then attack the following day. PA( OA( NA( @A( BA( CA( A( Q%-( )"4( M46( )$"( R&8( <;#( <"-( Figure 13: Distribution of Days that Jester Has Successfully Attacked Targets.Figure 14 depicts the months of The Jester’s attacks. March, July, and November standout predominantly. Could this support the notion that The Jester is somehow involvedwith academia? Typically, academic institutions offer Spring Break in late March andearly April, with summer leave in July and multiple holidays during the month ofNovember. Could The Jester be a member of academia using these block leave dates forthe bulk of his attacks? We may never know, which still remains the greatest strength ofThe Jester. In the next section, we will examine how he has been able to remainanonymous for over two years.)*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 22. The Jester Dynamic! 21( TA( SA( PA( OA( NA( @A( BA( CA( A( *;-( R4=( Q;&( !?&( Q;G( *"-( *"D( !">( <4?( +1#( U%7( :41( Figure 14: Distribution of the Months that Jester Has Successfully Attacked Targets.5.2. Non-Repudiation of Attack, Ability to Remain Anonymous In a message to Anonymous spokesman Barrett Brown, The Jester described thedifficulty in concealing his true identity: Let me break it down for you Brown, I have been operating for 2 YEARS ….alone. In that time I have had ‘over 9000’ anons trying to find me, along with multiple Law Enforcement Agencies, not to mention an Army of Muslim Extremists who would love nothing more than to saw my face off on cam, with a rusty nail. The Jester’s words are certainly inflammatory and meant to incite support to hiscause. Nonetheless, his words accurately describe his scenario. Consider the victims ofThe Jester for a moment. He has attacked militant Jihadists for two straight years,remotely shut down WikiLeaks, attacked a ministry of hatred, psychologically operatedagainst a Libyan strongman, and aided in the arrest of members of the hacker groupAnonymous and its elite splinter cell LulzSec. LulzSec successfully attacked the Central Intelligence Agency of the UnitedStates. WikiLeaks, in turn, has amassed the largest public collection of stolen classifieddocuments. The WestBoro Baptist Church found a way to hold a soldier’s familyfinancially accountable for attempting to disrupt a protest at their son’s funeral.(Grinberg, 2010) The Jester’s targets are all empire-builders. In his fight against them,)*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 23. The Jester Dynamic! 22(The Jester acted as David slaying Goliath, not once but six separate times. With hisenemies fallen, not one has identified his true identity. Not a single law enforcementagency has detained and arrested The Jester or issued an arrest warrant with his trueidentity. How has The Jester accomplished such a feat? Even the very competent and elitehackers of LulzSec eventually were de-anonymized and captured. How can a singlepatriot hacker remain anonymous in his attacks and continue to operate for two yearsundetected? The answer lies in his lack of reliance upon anyone else. While#anonymousSabu counted on the technical competence of members of his elite group andthe savvy political skills of Topiary to promote their cause, The Jester essentiallyperforms all his work. He continues to perform his own reconnaissance, targeting,promotion, and research and development. Over 200 successful attacks against seventy-five different independent targets in two years and The Jester remains anonymous. In thenext section we will discuss how he maintains this tempo and success rate by in-houseresearch and development.5.3. Research and Development Capabilities Consider for a moment the initial criticisms of The Jester. Some argued that hewas only capable of only adding a GUI to a well-known attack against ApacheWebservers. His critics argued that The Jester lacked any real knowledge of attacks andwas simply bold enough to perform attacks. However, time and again The Jester hassilenced this criticism. (Jeter, 2011) Consider the moments when The Jester changed tactics. In January 2011, TheJester applied reverse-engineering techniques by crippling the software of Anonymous.In March 2011, he invented a technique for inserting stories into two separateinternational newspapers. By summer 2011, he joined forces with a powerful group thatused sound investigative and reconnaissance skills and tools to de-anonymize the elitehacker group, LulzSec. Yet, as all these operations continued, The Jester successfullydeveloped two new tools: Leonidas and Saladin. By December 2011, The Jestersuccessfully launched Saladin against a target.)*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 24. The Jester Dynamic! 23( Anyone that has served a day in any military knows that you have an operationsplanning cell, a targeting cell, and then men who are actually the boots on the ground.The Jester continues to attack while at the same time doing his own targeting, planning,and development of tools. This itself is an incredible feat. However, consider the fact thatThe Jester most likely also has a 9-to-5 job. Certainly his patriot hacking provides nofinancial incentive, so these attacks are most likely carried out in his free time. Thisassumption is supported by the knowledge that Sunday appears to be the most prominentday for his attacks, with fifty independent attacks occurring on Sundays versus anaverage of 28.3 attacks occurring on each of the remaining days of the week. The Jester has proven incredibly resourceful in research and development. In2011, The US cyber-security budget spent $139 million for US Cyber Command andreceived a $105 million increase from previous years (Kruzel, 2010). Yet, at best we cantell The Jester receives no official funding or support, and has continued to attack over atwo-year span. His unflagging ability to morph tactics while still attacking remains one ofhis greatest strengths.5.4. Cyber-Fratricide Incidents Clearly, The Jester is a controversial figure. While some information securityprofessionals may support The Jester’s cause, his activities have lead to personal attackson fifteen innocent individuals, including Robin Jackson. Additionally, The Jester falselyaccused Hugo Carvalho as the leader of the hacker group that took down the Web site ofthe Central Intelligence Agency. We can only imagine that this fingering did andcontinues to significantly impact Mr. Cavalho’s personal life. Arguably The Jester does interfere with ongoing cyber operations by intelligenceand government agencies tasked with those missions. On a bureaucratic level, a greatdeal of effort is made before the US government can perform any cyber mission toprevent cyber fratricide on a target. In contrast, The Jester receives no official authorityand therefore is exempt from asking permission. This does mean his attacks can occurswiftly, such as we saw in the attack on WikiLeaks. One would imagine it would be inthe best interest of the US government to shut down that particular Web site. However,officially, The Jester remains the only individual capable of carrying out such an activity.)*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 25. The Jester Dynamic! 24( Does The Jester’s ability to strike precisely and quickly outweigh his lack ofcoordination with intelligence and government agencies? It appears to do so in hisutilitarian mind. However, consider a hypothetical attack by The Jester on the Web sitewww.baghdadsniper.net. This Web site served as a recruiting ground for militantJihadists. The Jester’s attack disrupted this Web site and drew attention to it. This type ofactivity most likely pushed underground the operators of the Web site and individualsinterested in visiting it. The Jester’s attack could hypothetically cost intelligence agenciesactable intelligence on a target that could lead to the capture of a militant Jihadistrecruitment team. While this is a purely hypothetical example, it does highlight theproblem with a rogue patriot hacker who receives no official authority.6. Conclusions In conclusion, we have addressed the storied history of patriot hacker, The Jester,and his campaign of unmanaged, asymmetric cyber warfare. Without a doubt, The Jesterhas succeeded in his campaign of cyber warfare over a two-year span. He hasaccomplished in his intentions to push militant Jihadists underground and deny them safehaven on the Internet. His attacks have mutated, supporting multiple different types of targets, while atthe same time his tactics have morphed as well. While maintaining a considerably fastoperating tempo of three unique targets every month and discrete attacks every week, TheJester has found a way to perform reconnaissance, targeting, research and development,and publicized his attacks. In discussing his different campaigns, we have come to realizethat he has acted as David slaying a few giants, including members of Anonymous andtheir elite splinter cell LulzSec, the WestBoro Baptist Church, militant Jihadists using theweb to spread propaganda, and Libyan strongmen. Additionally, The Jester’s strengths liein his ability to remain anonymous in denied sanctuary. Two hundred attacks in twoyears, and we still do not have an identity for this hacker. As we discussed in section 5,we can only really hypothesize the effects The Jester has had on intelligence communityactivities. However, we discussed possible cyber-fratricide incidents and the impacts TheJester may have had on ongoing intelligence collection operations.)*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 26. The Jester Dynamic! 25( In conclusion, The Jester has taught us quite a bit about cyber warfare. Thisdomain is one that favors David over Goliath. Fully functional teams like LulzSecsucceed in the short term with precision strikes, as we saw in their campaign of terror;however, they ultimately fail when personalities inside or attached to the group crumble.In contrast, individuals excel and continue to remain anonymous because they do notcount on outside resources and significantly reduce their threat vectors. The Jester hasproved that a single individual is very capable of waging cyber war at a level wepreviously attributed only to intelligence agencies or crime syndicates.( ()*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 27. The Jester Dynamic! 26(7. References(Bentham, J., & Lafleur, L. J. (1948). An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. New York: Hafner Pub. Co.Bowne, S. (2011, August 4). Three generations of DoS attacks. Defcon 2011. Retrieved from https://media.defcon.org/dc-19/presentations/Bowne/DEFCON-19-Bowne- Three-Generations-of-DoS-Attacks.pdfBowne, S. (2011, April 18). Mid-Pacific ICT Center: Why the Jester and Anonymous are Both Wrong. Mid-Pacific ICT Center. Retrieved January 21, 2012, from http://mpictcenter.blogspot.com/2011/04/why-jester-and-anonymous-are-both- wrong.htmlEimiller, L. (2011, September 22). Member of hacking group LulzSec arrested for June 2011 intrusion of Sony Pictures computer systems. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Retrieved from www.fbi.gov/losangeles/press- releases/2011/member-of-hacking-group-lulzsec-arrested-for-june-2011- intrusion-of-sony-pictures-computer-systemsFinkle, J. (2011, December 30). Stratfor Hack: Anonymous-Affiliated Hackers Publish Thousands Of Credit Card Numbers. Breaking News and Opinion on The Huffington Post. Retrieved January 21, 2012, from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/30/stratfor-hack- anonymous_n_1176726.htmlFreed, A. (2010, March 11). Hacker releases second video of enhanced XerXeS DoS attack on Apache vulnerability. InfoSec Island. Retrieved from www.infosecisland. com/blogview/3258-Hacker-Releases-Second-Video-of-Enhanced-XerXeS-DoS- Attack-on-Apache-Vulnerability-.htmlFreed, A. (2010, January 27). Hacktivist tactics raise ethical questions. Infosec Island. Retrieved from http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/2695-Hacktivist-Tactics- Raise-Ethical-Questions.html)*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 28. The Jester Dynamic! 27(Freed, A. (2011, March 20). Patriot hacker The Jester’s Libyan psyops campaign. Infosec Island. Retrieved from http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/12745-Patriot- Hacker-The-Jesters-Libyan-Psyops-Campaign.htmlGreene, R., & Hughes, N. (2010, October 29). “Hacktivist for good” claims WikiLeaks takedown. CNN U.S. Retrieved from http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-29/us/ wikileaks.hacker_1_wikileaks-computer-hacker-cyber-attack?_s=PM:USGrinberg, E. (2010, March 30). Dead Marines father ordered to pay protesters legal costs. CNN U.S. Retrieved from http://articles.cnn.com/2010-03- 30/justice/westboro.baptist.snyder_1_military-funerals-albert-snyder-westboro- baptist-church?_s=PM:CRIMEHacktivist confirms infecting Anonymous DHN.zip file. (2011, January 19). Infosec Island. Retrieved from http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/11140-Hacktivist- Confirms-Infecting-Anonymous-DHNzip-File.htmlHacktivist maintains attack on Westboro Baptist Church. (2011, April 11). INFOSEC INDIA. Retrieved from http://infosecindia.com/2011/04/02/ hacktivist-maintains- attack-on-westboro-baptist-church/Jeter, C. (2011, December 12). Cyberwarfare Roshambo: th3j35t3r Profiled - SC Magazine. IT Security News and Security Product Reviews - SC Magazine. Retrieved January 21, 2012, from http://www.scmagazine.com/cyberwarfare- roshambo-th3j35t3r-profiled/article/194123/Kruzel, J. (2010, February 4). Defense.gov news article: Cybersecurity seizes more attention, budget dollars. US Department of Defense. Retrieved from http:// www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=57871LulzSec attacks CIA web site, taunts The Jester. (2011, June 16). InfoSec Island. Retrieved from http://infosecisland.com/blogview/14496-LulzSec-Attacks-CIA- Website-Taunts-The-Jester.html)*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 29. The Jester Dynamic! 28(McCullagh, D. (2009, December 17). U.S. was warned of predator drone hacking. CBS News. Retrieved from http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504383_162-5988978- 504383.html.Nominations for the pwnie awards. (2011, July 20). pwnies.com. Retrieved from http:// pwnies.com/nominations/Post-shipwreck LulzSec is cornered by FBI and hackers—Leader Sabu outed. (2011, June 29). IBTimes New York. Retrieved from http://newyork.ibtimes.com/articles/ 171674/20110629/lulzsec-leader-sabu-identity-anonymous-antisec-disband- topiary-outed.htmRaviv. (2010, October 20). R-U-Dead-Yet. HybridSec. Retrieved from http://hybridsec. com/tools/rudy/RSnake. (2010, December 1). Slowloris HTTP DoS. ha.ckers.org web application security lab. Retrieved from http://ha.ckers.org/slowloris/Special Forces Mission. (2012, January 10). Special forces groups—Green Berets. Retrieved from http://www.groups.sfahq.com/command/mission.htmTh3J35t3r [The Jester]. (2010, January 1). Jester’s court: Official blog of Th3j35t3r. Retrieved from http://th3j35t3r.wordpress.com/Th3J35t3r [The Jester]. (2010, December 30). Message to #anonOOPS « . Jester’s court. Retrieved from http://th3j35t3r.wordpress.com/2010/12/30/message-to-anonoops/U.S. Special Operations Command. (2012, January 10). GlobalSecurity.org—Reliable security information. Retrieved from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ agency/dod/socom.htmVance, A. (2010, December 4). WikiLeaks struggles to keep a step ahead of hackers. New York Times.com. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/04/world/ europe/04domain.htmlVinograd, C. (2011, June 22). Ryan Cleary, suspected teen LulzSec hacker, charged with cybercrimes in U.K. The Huffington Post. Retrieved from http://www.)*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 30. The Jester Dynamic! 29( huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/22/ ryan-cleary-lulzsec-hacker-charged-cybercrime- uk_n_882453.htmlWho is th3j35t3r? « T3h H3r0d07u5 R3p0r7. (2010, December 17). T3h H3r0d07u5 R3p0r7. Retrieved from http://h3r0d07u5.wordpress.com/2010/12/17/who-is- th3j35t3r/()*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 31. The Jester Dynamic! 30(A1. Appendix A1: Jester’s Targets(4chan.org www.cablegatesearch.netjixad.tk www.einladungzumparadies.demuslimsagainstcrusades.com www.falojaa.netwww.3bwat.info www.fatwa1.comwww.absba.org www.godhatesfags.comwww.abu-qatada.com www.h-alali.netwww.al-amanh.net www.hizb-america.orgwww.al-islam.com www.iaisite-eng.orgwww.albasrah.net www.ikhwan.netwww.alboraq.info www.imamtv.comwww.alboraqforum.info www.islam-ucoii.itwww.albukhari.com www.islamicawakening.comwww.alemara1.com www.islamicboard.comwww.alemarah-iea.net www.islamicemirate.comwww.alemarah.co.tv www.itaqulaah.comwww.alemarah.info www.jihadunspun.comwww.alfaloja.net www.kalamullah.comwww.alfidaa.info www.kavkaz.org.ukwww.alghurabaa.org www.lulzsecurity.comwww.aljahad.com www.majahden.comwww.almadad1.com www.mmagreb.comwww.almaghrib.org www.modawanati.comwww.almaqdese.net www.mojahden.netwww.almedad.com www.mtj.twwww.almedad.net www.muslimdefenseforce.islamicink.comwww.almoslim.net www.muslimsagainstcrusades.comwww.alqimmah.net www.muslm.netwww.alqoqaz.net www.rjfront.infowww.altartosi.com www.sawtaljihad.orgwww.annabaa.org www.shahamat-english.comwww.anonyops.com www.sharia4belgium.webs.comwww.ansar1.info www.talabeyes.comwww.ansarullah.co.cc www.tawhed.netwww.aqsatv.ps www.tawhed.wswww.as-ansar.com www.tawheedmedia.comwww.at-tawbah.net www.theunjustmedia.comwww.atahadi.com www.way2allah.comwww.baghdadsniper.net www.wikileaks.org()*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 32. The Jester Dynamic! 31(A2. Appendix A2: Jester’s WBC Release(GODHATESFAGS.COM - Tango down 1 Month and counting. (THATS 4 WEEKS)Also all of the Westboro Baptist Church secondary domains (listed below) - Also their3rd party hosted blog hosted at:http://blogs.sparenot.com/index.php/godsmacks - TANGO DOWNThats one whole month WBC???? I thought you guys were just rebooting? Also why didya remove all ya websites from your official letterhead: http://twitter.com/#!/th3j35t3r/status/48508992082808833 Americaisdoomed.com - TANGO DOWN priestsrapeboys.com - TANGO DOWN godhatesireland.com - TANGO DOWN godhatesmexico.com - TANGO DOWN godhatescanada.com - TANGO DOWN Godhatesfags.com - TANGO DOWN sparenot.com - TANGO DOWN thebeastobama.com - TANGO DOWN yourpastorisawhore.com - TANGO DOWN godhatestheworld.com - TANGO DOWN godhatessweden.com - TANGO DOWN Jewskilledjesus.com - TANGO DOWN godistheterrorist.com - TANGO DOWN godhatesamerica.com - TANGO DOWN godhatesthemedia.com - TANGO DOWN signmovies.com - TANGO DOWN signmovies.net - TANGO DOWN fredthemovie.com - TANGO DOWN hatemongers.com - TANGO DOWN stay frosty th3j35t3r Theres an unequal amount of good and bad in most things. Trick is to figure outthe ratio and act accordingly. http://twitter.com/th3j35t3r http://th3j35t3r.wordpress.com)*(+,%--%&.(#%1%--%&23;9#4&9?&%>&;359;-9546"( ( (
  • 33. Last Updated: April 3rd, 2012 Upcoming SANS Training Click Here for a full list of all Upcoming SANS Events by LocationSANS Cyber Guardian 2012 Baltimore, MD Apr 30, 2012 - May 07, 2012 Live EventSANS Secure Europe 2012 Amsterdam, Netherlands May 07, 2012 - May 19, 2012 Live EventSANS Security West 2012 San Diego, CA May 10, 2012 - May 18, 2012 Live EventSANS Toronto 2012 Toronto, ON May 14, 2012 - May 19, 2012 Live EventSANS at ITWeb Security Summit Johannesburg, South May 17, 2012 - May 18, 2012 Live Event AfricaSANS Brisbane 2012 Brisbane, Australia May 21, 2012 - May 26, 2012 Live EventBeta SEC642 Advanced Web App Penetration Testing and Atlanta, GA May 21, 2012 - May 26, 2012 Live EventEthical HackingSANS Secure Indonesia 2012 Jakarta, Indonesia May 28, 2012 - Jun 02, 2012 Live EventBeta SEC528 SANS Training Program for the New CompTIA Boston, MA Jun 04, 2012 - Jun 08, 2012 Live EventAdvanced Security Practitioner CertificationSANS Rocky Mountain 2012 Denver, CO Jun 04, 2012 - Jun 09, 2012 Live EventSANS @ info360 New York City, NY Jun 12, 2012 - Jun 13, 2012 Live EventSANS Malaysia 2012 Cyberjaya, Malaysia Jun 18, 2012 - Jun 23, 2012 Live EventForensics and Incident Response Summit Austin, TX Jun 20, 2012 - Jun 27, 2012 Live EventSANS Canberra 2012 Canberra, Australia Jul 02, 2012 - Jul 10, 2012 Live EventSANS Northern Virginia 2012 OnlineVA Apr 15, 2012 - Apr 20, 2012 Live EventSANS OnDemand Books & MP3s Only Anytime Self Paced
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